Does aid buy votes? by Paolo Pinotti & Riccardo Settimo
Questioni di Economia e Finanza
(Occasional Papers)
Does aid buy votes?
















1Questioni di Economia e Finanza
(Occasional papers)
Number 101 – July 2011
Does aid buy votes?
















 The  series  Occasional Papers presents studies and documents on issues pertaining to the 
institutional tasks of the Bank of Italy and the Eurosystem. The Occasional Papers appear alongside 
the Working Papers series which are specifically aimed at providing original contributions to economic 
research. 
 The  Occasional Papers include studies conducted within the Bank of Italy, sometimes in 
cooperation with the Eurosystem or other institutions. The views expressed in the studies are those of the 
authors and do not involve the responsibility of the institutions to which they belong. 
  The series is available online at www.bancaditalia.it.  DOES AID BUY VOTES? 
 





We use data for 143 developing countries during the period 1980-2004 to study 
empirically the relationship between multilateral aid (as proxied by IDA flows) and support 
for US foreign policy, as measured by voting alignment at the United Nations General 
Assembly. Our identification strategy exploits exogenous variations in international 
commodity prices and natural disasters to address causality from aid to voting. Our results 
suggest that, even though multilateral and bilateral aid flows are both associated with greater 
voting alignment, the causal effect of multilateral aid is not significantly different from zero. 
This result is robust to controlling for other determinants of voting patterns, for unobserved 
heterogeneity at the country level and for common time trends. 
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1 Introduction 
In spite of the officially declared goal of fostering economic growth and reducing 
poverty in recipient economies, development aid has often been considered as a tool for 
donors to pursue their political and commercial goals. While this is certainly plausible for 
bilateral aid flows, which are decided directly by the single donor countries, this possibility 
is much less clear cut for the disbursements by the World Bank or other multilateral 
development agencies. 
On the one hand, indeed, international financial institutions are equipped with detailed 
and transparent allocation systems based solely on the needs/merits of recipient countries. 
On the other hand, however, the Bretton Woods institutions have often been accused of 
serving the interests of the US. Indeed, the US is by far the major shareholder of both the 
World Bank and the IMF, retaining veto power in both institutions. Also, according to a 
long-standing informal agreement, the President of the World Bank is always a US national. 
Therefore, determining whether multilateral agencies provide a filter between single 
donor country geopolitical interests and the allocation of foreign aid is ultimately an 
empirical issue. In this paper, we investigate whether multilateral aid flows drive greater 
support for the US foreign policy, as measured by the fraction of times in which receiving 
countries vote in line with the US at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).  
This is an extremely important issue. During the next few years, international capital 
flows, and aid flows among them, will be adversely affected by the global crisis and its 
impact on donors’ fiscal balances; as a result, it is likely that multilateral donor agencies will 
acquire an ever important role in the international aid architecture. At the same time, along 
with their (formal) legitimacy, it becomes more and more important to establish some clean 
facts about their (substantial) credibility and independence. 
Our empirical analysis is conducted on a panel of 143 countries observed during the 
period 1980-2004. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates, which exploit within-country 
variation in multilateral aid disbursements and voting alignment, suggest that higher 
amounts of multilateral aid are associated with a higher likelihood of voting in line with the 
US at the UNGA. In particular, after controlling for common (yearly) shocks, bilateral US   6
aid disbursement and for the main country characteristics, raising multilateral aid flows by 
1% increases the percentage of times in which the receiving country votes in line with the 
US by about 0.1 points. 
Even after controlling for the effect of other observable and unobservable (country-and 
year-specific) factors, however, there are several reasons to expect aid disbursements and 
voting alignment to be correlated (apart from strategic motives in aid allocations). Most 
likely, common interests could drive both political and economic support (without 
implying direct vote-buying). For this reason, we exploit exogenous variation in 
international commodity price movements and natural disasters to identify the effect of aid 
on voting. In particular, we use measures of price-induced terms of trade deterioration and 
the incidence and severity of natural disasters as instruments for multilateral aid in a Two 
Stage Least Squares framework. 
Indeed, if development aid were paid for by votes at UNGA, both commodity price 
movements and natural disasters should shift its demand schedule by altering the marginal 
utility of aid for developing countries. Exogenous variation in demand allows then to 
identify the supply elasticity, i.e. at which “price” (in terms of votes) donor agencies supply 
aid to developing countries. First stage regressions confirm that both instruments exert a 
significant effect on aid disbursements. Also, they exclude an effect through bilateral aid, 
which is not affected by either commodity price movements or natural disasters, allowing 
us to appreciate the differential effect of the two types of aid. Finally, the over identifying 
restriction tests cannot reject the null hypothesis that commodity prices and natural 
disasters affect voting at UNGA only through multilateral aid. 
The results of this exercise lead us to exclude that multilateral aid exerts a causal effect 
on voting at UNGA. Indeed, the coefficient of multilateral aid is never statistically 
significant in the second stage. This result is extremely robust to the specification of both 
first and second stage regressions. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the operations 
of the World Bank (IDA in particular), focusing on allocation criteria and relative power of 
the US in the institution. In section 3 we provide a brief survey of the empirical literature 
on the determinants of foreign aid. Section 4 contains a description of the data and 
methodology. Section 5 shows the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.   7
2  The International Development Association (IDA) 
The World Bank (the Bank) was created in the aftermath of WWII to finance 
reconstruction in European countries. In the following years the focus gradually shifted to 
developing countries. Today the Bank is a group of institutions (World Bank Group, 
WBG) that lend to Governments mainly through two institutions, the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) – which finances middle-income countries –
and the International Development Association (IDA) – which supports the poorest 
countries. According to the Group’s mission statement, loans are aimed at improving living 
conditions and reducing poverty; its projects are generally financed against policy 
conditionality, although the extent to which recipients actually comply with conditions is 
highly controversial. 
Established in 1960, IDA provides grants and concessional loans to the world’s poorest 
countries for programs aimed at supporting economic growth, reducing inequalities and 
improving people’s standards of living. For many years IDA has been the second largest 
donor after the US Agency for International Development and the largest among 
multilateral agencies.  
In addition, with its 170 members, IDA is the only truly global multilateral institution 
specialised in providing aid to low income countries. Its resources are distributed according 
to a detailed and transparent set of allocation criteria. Eligibility depends on GNI per 
capita, creditworthiness in international capital markets, and adherence to specified policy 
and institutional standards.
1 Among eligible countries, the bulk of the funds go to those 
that are among the poorest (GNI per capita) and with higher CPR (Country Performance 
Rating). This latter is a weighted average of two other indices: the CPIA (Country Policy 
and Institutional Assessment, 80 per cent), which measures the quality of governance, and 
the ARPP (Annual Report on Portfolio Performance, 20 per cent), indicating the 
performance of past projects in the country.
2 A formula – based on GNI per capita and 
CPR – determines the amount of IDA finance that a country can expect to receive, taking 
                                                 
1 In fiscal year 2009, the per capita GNI eligibility cut-off was $ 1,095. 
2 The CPIA is an average of 20 indicators assembled in four categories: economic management, structural 
policies, policies for social inclusion / equity, public sector management and institutions.   8
for granted the existence of good quality projects. This, however, is just a reference value; 
exceptions are possible, and quite frequent indeed.
3 
The Board of Executive Directors discusses and approves all loans and policy issues, 
on the basis of papers prepared by the Bank’s staff. Five nations (France, Germany, Japan, 
the UK and the US) have a single chair each in the Board; all other countries are grouped 
in nineteen constituencies. Voting power is based on membership votes, allocated equally 
among members, and subscription votes, linked to members’ initial and subsequent 
subscriptions and cumulative contributions. 
As already discussed in the introduction, the US maintains a predominant role in the 
World Bank. This is true also for the particular case of IDA. Even though, differently from 
what happens at the IBRD, the US do not formally retain veto power in IDA, they have it 
in practice. Currently, they enjoy a voting power of 12.52 percent and IDA requires a 
qualified majority of 85 percent for the most important decisions, which implies that 
coalition with a small number of members is sufficient to govern the decision process. In 
principle, such conditions may cast doubts about the motivations of multilateral aid 
allocations analogous to those involved in bilateral aid, which in turn have sparkled a whole 
academic literature. 
                                                 
3 Single scores on CPIA, ARPP and CPR are not disclosed. Quintile distributions are available covering only 
the last five years.   9
3 Literature  review 
The relationship between aid and voting has been the subject of a vast body of 
literature. Studies have tried to shed light on both directions of causality. Some investigate 
the aid-buying conduct of beneficiaries and therefore concentrate on the influence of 
voting on aid; others, on the contrary, by focusing on the impact of aid on voting, aim at 
highlighting the vote-buying behaviour of donors. 
This latter family of studies, that is clearly the one we are interested in, turns out to be 
part of a wider strand of the literature on the motivations of donors in distributing grants 
and concessional resources to recipient countries. Such studies usually run simple 
correlations or multiple regressions using a set of variables that are associated to either the 
interests of donors (i.e. aid is given according to commercial or political convenience, 
“egoistic view”) or to the welfare of the recipients (i.e. donors help for humanitarian 
reasons, “altruistic view”), and proceed to testing their relative significance in explaining aid 
allocations. 
As to bilateral aid, the presence of a strong egoistic drive on the part of donor seems 
out of discussion. Alesina and Dollar (2000), for instance, try to capture the strategic 
interests of donors, by including their colonial links with the recipients
4, besides other 
factors like the beneficiaries’ income per capita and the quality of their institutions and 
policies. They find colonial past and political alliances to be the most important factors 
explaining aid allocation. 
Berthelemy and Tichit (2004) focus on the change of donor behaviour over time and 
conclude that colonial bias has weakened after the end of the cold war in favour of 
commercial factors and reward for sound economic policies (since 1990). Berthelemy 
(2006) uses a very large three dimensional panel dataset (donor, recipient and time) to 
compare donors according to their degree of altruism in aid allocation; he finds that most 
donors behave in an egoistic way. 
                                                 
4 Namely, they choose to build a “friendship” variable to assess the strategic interest of donors, using the 
correlation between donor’s and recipient’s voting pattern in the United Nations General Assembly.   10
Relatively less work has been done on multilateral aid, a field in which one would 
expect allocation criteria and determinants to differ from the bilateral case. According to 
some (Burnside and Dollar, 2000), indeed, multilateral aid arrangements have been 
established precisely in order to support non-strategic countries that would not receive aid 
otherwise. Many critics, however, have opposed fiercely this view, suggesting instead that 
geopolitical considerations weigh heavily on aid allocated by multilateral institutions, as 
they are dominated by the major advanced countries. In other words, powerful members 
would tend to use international institutions to pursue their interest, diverting them from 
their governing principles. 
Dreher et al. (2009) identify three kinds of benefits for influential countries of rewarding 
other governments indirectly through multilateral institutions rather than directly via their 
own aid programs: (i) political advantages, to the extent that vote-trading arrangements 
made through international organisations are less visible and therefore less prone to public 
condemnation for both the pressuring and the pressured countries; (ii) leverage 
mechanisms, linked to the conditionality of international institutions, much wider than that 
any single donor can impose; (iii) moderate costs of loans, thanks to burden sharing and 
tapping into resources from income generated by the same institutions. Mavrotas and 
Villanger (2006) assume the existence of efficiency gains from giving aid through 
multilateral institutions rather than more directly through bilateral agencies; this would be 
true in the case of projects that are particularly large or technically very complex to 
implement, wherein multilateral agencies show clear comparative advantages. 
Regarding the International Monetary Fund, Barro and Lee (2005) find that the 
probability and size of the Fund’s loans were larger when a country had more political and 
economic proximity to the United States and the major Western European countries. They 
measure political proximity by voting patterns in the U.N. General Assembly and economic 
proximity by bilateral trading volume. Similarly, Dreher and Jensen (2007) show that IMF 
conditionality is driven by its major shareholder, the United States; in particular, their 
empirical results reveal that countries that vote with the United States in the UN General 
Assembly systematically receive less conditions on IMF loans. 
As to the World Bank, in their early work Frey and Schneider (1986), and Frey (1984) 
argue that the itcan generally be considered as representing donors interests in proportion   11
to their contributions. As put in Gwin (1997), ”Throughout the history of the World Bank, 
the US has been the largest shareholder and most influential member country” and ”the US 
has viewed all multilateral organizations, including the World Bank, as instruments of 
foreign policy”. Faini and Grilli (2004) find that the lending pattern of both the IMF and 
World Bank is influenced by the commercial and the financial interests of the US and, to a 
lesser extent, of the EU. Fleck and Kilby (2006) use country-level panel data to test 
whether World Bank lending is influenced by US interests; their results are consistent with 
a significant US influence, but one which varies across presidential administrations. 
Notwithstanding the Bank’s detailed lending framework described in the previous sec-
tion, there is evidence that, in the past, political pressures have influenced the institution’s 
operations. The Bank itself admits in its website that ’during the Cold War years aid was 
politically motivated’, but then adds ’now however, aid is being delivered to countries most 
in need and to those who show they are determined to use it well’. In line with this, Dreher 
and Sturm (2006) provide evidence that IMF and World Bank financing had an impact on 
voting at the UNGA until 1990 (but not thereafter). In addition, Andersen et al. (2006) 
demonstrate that, when key votes are used to proxy voting alignment, it is possible to 
capture a statistically significant US influence on IDA lending during the period 1993-2000. 
Yet, these results are based on simple regressions that do not take adequately into account 
the endogeneity of aid allocations. In practice, however, both aid and voting are very likely 
to be simultaneously determined in equilibrium. In the next sections we describe our 
empirical strategy for dealing with this issue.   12
4  Data and empirical strategy 
Our empirical analysis aims at identifying the effect of bilateral and multilateral aid 
flows on the voting decisions of the recipient countries at the UNGA. Thus, the main 
estimating equation is: 
 
VOTINGit = βMULTit + γBILATit + Xit + Eit   (1)  
 
where MULTit and BILATit denote the amount of multilateral and bilateral aid received by 
country i during year t, VOTINGit is its voting decision, Xit is a vector of other variables 
possibly correlated with both aid and voting and Eit is an error term. The coefficient of 
main interest is β. 
Our dataset merges information from several sources. The first is the OECD-DAC 
Database on Aid, which contains yearly data on bilateral aid disbursements from 
Development Assistance Committee members since 1980. We used these statistics to 
construct the series of the (log of) US and total IDA aid flows to each recipient country, 
expressed at constant 2000 US dollars. These two variables represent our measure of 
bilateral and multilateral aid, respectively.
5 Figure 1 shows their evolution during our 
sample period. While bilateral aid is quantitatively more important throughout the whole 
period, it is also much more volatile. By contrast, multilateral aid grows steadily over time 
and it is much less sensitive to business cycle fluctuations. Data on aid flows were then 
merged to those on voting at the UNGA, compiled by Erik Voeten on the basis of several 
sources.
6 In particular, we calculated the percentage of times in which, during each year, the 
vote of the country matched that expressed by the US. This variable captures the extent to 
which aid recipients’ voting is in line with the US geopolitical interests. While searching for 
an effect of aid on voting, we control for other factors possibly correlated with both 
variables, namely recipient countries GDP, population, openness, trade relationships with 
the US and (different measures of) the quality of institutions. 
                                                 
5 Using IDA disbursements as a proxy of multilateral aid helps to better test the influence of the mighty 
donors, since IDA relies much more heavily (than the IBRD, for instance) on periodic replenishments by the 
major shareholders. 
6 The complete list is available at http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/ev42/UNVoting.htm.   13
 
Finally, we collected also data on exogenous events that impact on aid disbursements, 
while being at the same time uncorrelated with the error term, to use as instruments for aid 
flows in equation (1). The first source of exogenous variation is provided by natural 
disasters, as measured by the data set Emergency Events Database (EMDAT), maintained 
by the Universit Catholique de Louvain (http://www.emdat.be/). Since reliable measures 
are available only for earthquakes (as opposed to other calamities like flood, draughts, etc.), 
we have limited ourselves to this type of natural disaster. In particular, we construct: a 
binary variable, taking value one if and only if the country was hit by (at least) one 
earthquake in a given year; and a continuous measure, equal to the total intensity of all 
earthquakes occurring in the country in a given year, as measured by (the sum of) their 
Richter magnitude.
7 The second source of exogenous variation is represented by 
international commodity price movements. We construct a measure of price-induced terms 
of trade shock as the interaction between the log-change of yearly World commodity price 
                                                 
7 EMDAT includes only disasters that fulfil at least one of the following criteria: 10 or more people reported 
killed; 100 people reported affected; declaration of a state of emergency; call for international assistance. For 
this reason, our binary variable considers only earthquakes that are ”serious” in some respects.   14
with the external dependence of each country for that commodity, as measured by imports 
minus exports of that commodity over GDP. These measure was computed for three 
(aggregate) categories of primary commodities: food, oil and raw materials. The exact 
definition and the data sources of each variable are reported in the Appendix. 
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5 Results 
The results of our empirical analysis are presented in tables 1 to 5. We include in all 
specifications the (log of) country GDP and total population, as well as country and year 
fixed effects. Therefore, the identification of the coefficients of main interest exploits 
within-country variation in aid and voting, after controlling for common (unobserved) 
yearly shocks and for the main country characteristics. 
Table 1 reports baseline OLS estimates. In the first two columns we separately estimate 
the effect of multilateral and bilateral aid, as measured by the yearly amount of IDA and 
USA aid respectively. Both coefficients are positive and statistically significant, suggesting 
that voting at UNGA is correlated with both types of aid. The coefficient of bilateral aid is 
three times higher that that of multilateral aid, pointing possibly at a greater effect of 
bilateral aid flows. At their face value these results suggest that a 1 per cent increase in the 
total amount of multilateral and bilateral aid increases the probability that the country votes 
in line with the US by 0.06 and 0.18 percentage points, respectively. 
In column 3 the influence of different types of aid is distinguished by including both 
IDA and USA aid into the same specification. In line with the results of the previous 
columns, the effect of the latter seems much stronger. In particular, the coefficient of 
multilateral aid drops by one third and it is not statistically significant anymore, while that 
of bilateral aid remains unchanged. Therefore, according to these baseline regressions, once 
we control for the influence of US aid flows, the multilateral component of foreign aid 
does not appear to be a significant determinant of voting at UNGA. However, this result is 
extremely fragile to the inclusion of other variables into the specification. While controlling 
for international openness and trade linkages does not alter the main picture (column 4), 
taking into account the quality of institutions results in the coefficient of multilateral aid 
being also positive and statistically significant (column 5). Comparing this result (confirmed 
also in column 6, where we include both trade and institutional factors into the same 
equation) with the estimated coefficients in column 3 suggests that US foreign aid and 
alliances at UNGA are directed toward countries that enjoy greater freedom at the 
institutional and political level. By contrast, the doubling of the coefficient of multilateral 
aid from column 3 to 5 means that IDA flows may be not so selective in this respect.   16
The main message of the results presented in Table 1 is that the statistical significance 
of the coefficient of IDA flows depends strongly on the specification; therefore, the 
importance of the direct effect of multilateral aid cannot be definitively ascertained solely 
on the basis of these OLS regressions. Our identification strategy will thus exploit 
alternative sources of exogenous variation in aid flows to identify their effect on voting in a 
TSLS framework. 
In Tables 2 and 3 we investigate the effect of natural disasters and changes in 
international commodity prices on multilateral and bilateral aid flows, respectively. 
Regardless of whether we control or for trade and institutional quality, both adverse 
international food price movements and the occurrence of natural disasters drive greater 
amounts of multilateral aid flows; at the opposite, bilateral aid does not seem to respond to 
these factors. In these respects, therefore, multilateral agencies seem better able to target 
the needs generated by price-induced food crises and catastrophic events. Most importantly 
for the purpose of this work, the differential effect on the two types of aid provides us with 
a source of exogenous variation in multilateral aid, while leaving unaffected bilateral aid 
flows. 
In Table 4 we take advantage of this fact to identify the coefficient β in equation (1), by 
using food price movements and natural disasters as instruments for multilateral aid. The 
difference between the four columns in the table regards the specification of the first-stage 
regression. In all specifications, however, the effect of (the exogenous component of) 
multilateral aid estimated in the second stage is not significantly greater than zero. This 
result holds also when we include bilateral aid, along with other controls, in the regression 
(Table 5). Overall, these estimates suggest that, once we control for the possible 
endogeneity of aid flows, multilateral aid does not significantly affect country voting at 
UNGA.   17
6 Conclusions 
In this paper we contribute to a growing literature that tries to show that International 
Financial Institutions have been employed as a tool of foreign policy by their major 
shareholders. 
In order to do so, we investigate on whether aid by IDA, the largest multilateral 
channel for concessional financing to the world’s poorest countries, affects their 
conformity with US political interests at UNGA. Our empirical strategy allows to identify 
the causal effect of multilateral aid on voting decisions of the recipient country, through 
exploiting exogenous variation in international commodity prices and natural disasters. Our 
results suggest that, even though multilateral and bilateral aid flows are both associated 
with greater voting alignment, multilateral aid does not have a significant causal effect on 
voting. This is robust to controlling for other determinants of voting patterns, for 
unobserved heterogeneity at the country level and for common time trend. 
The empirical outcomes of our work bring renewed attention to the role of multilateral 
aid at times in which, being donor countries faced with daunting fiscal and debt problems, 
there is new emphasis on maximising the effectiveness of aid flows. Recent studies on the 
quality and effectiveness of Official Development Assistance (Birdsall and Kharas 2010, 
Knack et al. 2010, Easterly and Pfutze 2008) using different methodologies and indicators 
find that IDA ranks either at the top or among the top aid agencies. Top ranks, in 
particular, are obtained in two dimensions of the aid assessment: transparency, i.e. the 
possibility to assess compliance with internationally agreed standards, and  selectivity, i.e. 
the preferred targeting of the neediest and most deserving countries. Our work clearly does 
not address directly the issue of effectiveness, i.e. the capacity of aid to raise growth and 
alleviate poverty. Nonetheless, to the extent that the developmental effect of aid is likely to 
be compromised if conditioned on political favours, our study adds evidence in favour of 
reinforcing the role of IDA in the global aid architecture.   18
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Appendix 
VOTING: Percentage of times in which each country voted like the US at the United 
Nations General Assembly in a given year, excluding votations in which either the country 
or the US did not vote. Sources: Erik Voeten. 
ln IDA: log of total IDA aid ﬂows, expressed at constant 2000 US dollars, received by each 
country in a given year. Source: OECD-DAC database  
ln  USA: log of total USA bilateral aid flows, expressed at constant 2000 US dollars, 
received by each country in a given year. Source: OECD-DAC database  
ln GDP : log of gross domestic product converted to constant 2005 international dollars 
using purchasing power parity rates. Source: World Development Indicators  
ln POP : log of total country population. Source: World Development Indicators  
OPEN: sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross 
domestic product. Source: World Development Indicators  
TRADE
us: log of total trade flows with the US. Source: Comtrade  
FREEDOM: binary variable equal to 1 if the country scores 1 in the Political Rights Index 
of Freedom House. 
MILITARY : binary variable equal to 1 if the chief executive is a military officer, and equal 
to 0 otherwise. Source: World Bank Database of Political Institutions. 
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